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Terrorism has received considerable media and law enforcement atten-
tion during the past decade. However, part of the concern over terrorism 
by the general public and police officials may have been the result of 
sensationalist media practices.' Although research indicates that inter-
national terrorism in the United States has not increased significantly in 
recent years-, terrorism remains a dominant social and political concern of 
the American public. Much of this concern focuses upon (and rightfully so) 
the impact of an ambiguously defined concept — "terrorism" — and its 
implications for the maintenance of democratic society. Consequently, 
although the actual harm from terrorism has not reached proportions 
comparable to the harm from other criminal acts, the implications for its 
prevention and appropriate response to actual terrorist incidents pose 
significant problems for criminal justice officials. Public fear regarding 
terrorism and the lack of clearly defined preventive and response measures 
may produce "inordinate overreactions which may bring about stricter 
laws to combat terrorism and even repressive measures that threaten 
democratic institutions".' This paper describes the development of the 
United States Army Military Police School's Counterterrorism Course, 
its primary foci, and implications for criminal justice educators faced with 
the problem of developing appropriate plans for prevention and response 
to acts of terrorism. 
The U.S. Army Counterterrorism program began as a far-reaching 
mission requirement of the Army of the 1980's and was conceptualized in 
the mid-1970's. The mission to develop a program was officially given to 
the U.S. Army Military Police School in Army Regulation 190-52, dated 
15 June 1978. The regulation and later supplements require the Military 
Police School to develop appropriate training programs, as directed, 
which address those facets of the terrorist threat that require specialized 
training beyond that normally conducted for contingency planning, and to 
establish or modify courses as required. 
The Military Police School is a subordinate command of the Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and as such is responsible for the 
development and training of law enforcement and related personnel at all 
levels. Terrorism within the TRADOC community is divided into two 
separate and distinct areas. Countering terrorism directed against a U.S. 
military installation is a military police mission and function. Responding 
to terrorism outside military installations is a mission and function of the 
Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, which has total responsi-
bility for the development of all the doctrine and tactics relating to low 
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intensity conflict. Consequently, the course described below is applicable 
only for incidents occurring on U.S. Army military installations. 
Conceptual and Theoretical Problems 
During the initial stages of course development, two recurring theoreti-
cal and conceptual problems surfaced which had to be addressed. First, the 
conceptual ambiguity regarding a precise definition of terrorism becomes 
a major obstacle for practitioners attempting to develop appropriate 
response "techniques. Despite the increasing attention paid to terrorism, 
there has been little success in reaching a definition acceptable to either 
theorists or members of the international political community.4 Secondly, 
course developers were faced with developing a systematic attempt at pre-
dicting and preventing terrorism when much terrorist activity appears to 
defy rationality. Although these two conceptual issues are quite distinct, 
the implications for practitioners are highly related. 
The difficulties in defining terrorism have led to an everbroadening cate-
gory of violent (and in some cases, nonviolent) behavior labeled as 
terrorism, with little regard for considerations of the salient characteristics 
of what should (or should not) be considered terroristic in nature. 
Subsequently, terrorism has been considered synonymous with the "urban 
guerrilla," "freedom fighter," and has in many cases been limited to 
violence for political purposes.5 These ambiguities have led many to cate-
gorize varieties of terrorist activity. For example, Paul Wilkinson 
identifies epiphenomenal terror and three subcategories of political terror: 
repressive, sub-revolutionary, and revolutionary.6 Other typologies have 
focused upon geographical and national relationships in distinguishing 
among international, transnational, and domestic terrorism.7 Other 
researchers maintain that any definition of terrorism must consider the 
outcome, victims, violence utilized, motivation and goals of the 
"terrorists," as well as other criteria in the process of terrorism to 
adequately define the concept.8 
These conceptual difficulties have resulted in what Nicholas Kittrie has 
referred to as a "shotgun approach" by law enforcement agencies in deal-
ing with the problem.9 Indeed, the definition adopted by the Military 
Police School remains broad and non-specific: "the calculated use of 
violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, often political in nature, 
through instilling fear, intimidation, or coercion. . .a criminal act. . . 
intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims".10 
Although such a definition does not resolve the need for greater precision 
in conceptually defining terrorism, it does limit military utilization of the 
term to acts which are identified as criminal, and therefore subject to legal 
constraints and due process. The implications for utilization of this defini-
tion will be discussed later. 
Secondly, the issue of rationality inevitably arises when discussing 
efforts at prevention and deterrence. The problem is particularly acute 
when efforts at prediction are aimed at terroristic violence, which accord-
ing to Wilkinson is "inherently indiscriminate in its effects."" Wilkinson 
further identifies the "essentially arbitrary and unpredictable" nature of 
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terrorism as one of its salient characteristics. This issue became critically 
important to course developers who envisioned a "threat analysis" instruc-
tional package as a primary focus of the course. 
The extent to which human conduct is rational remains a controversial 
issue. Theorists in the social sciences differ markedly in their explanations 
of the motivations for human behavior: from the behaviorist's focus upon 
rewards and punishments to the psychoanalytic preoccupation with 
unconscious sexual drives.12 To the extent that much human behavior is 
goal-directed, this issue need not prevent attempts at prediction of terrorist 
activity, nor does it require that one theoretical perspective dominate 
efforts at prediction. Rather, positivistic efforts may proceed from an 
examination of the teleological nature of terrorist organization. Wilkinson 
acknowledges that when terrorists select individual targets "they do so, of 
necessity, clandestinely and according to their own idiosyncratic codes."13 
An examination of such codes reveals that much terrorist activity is indeed 
goal-directed, however "irrational" it may appear from our perspectives. 
For example, Carlos Marighella identified two major goals for the urban 
guerrilla: (1) the liquidation of the chiefs of the armed forces and police 
and (2) the expropriation of government resources. Terrorism was, accord-
ing to Marighella, a weapon the urban guerrilla should never reject. I4 An 
examination of the clandestine writings of other organizations supporting 
the use of terrorism reveals similar evidence of teleological activity which 
provides potential for scientific prediction.15 
Although the two conceptual problems discussed above have not been 
completely resolved, they are not seen as so debilitating as to preclude 
advances in developing strategies for predicting and intervening in terrorist 
activities. Because efforts at preventing terrorism on military installations 
are subsumed under the broader crime prevention programs at most 
installations and additional designated personnel are not forthcoming, the 
personnel limitations of these law enforcement agencies require the "shot-
gun" approach described by Kittrie. Second, because the response tech-
niques developed for handling a variety of criminal activities (e.g., bomb 
threats, kidnappings, hostage-takings) are conceptually similar to the 
responses to be utilized by commanders in the event of terrorist activity, 
the definitional problem regarding terrorism is not of such magnitude as to 
preclude instruction regarding legally acceptable responses to a variety of 
offenses that may be subsumed under the label of terrorism. 
Course Development 
The Military Police School, as a subordinate to TRADOC, subscribes 
to and utilizes the TRADOC Instructional Systems Development (ISD). 
The developmental process includes five interactive stages beginning with 
Phase I (analysis) and proceeding through phases in design, development, 
implementation, and evaluation. In conjunction with the ISD process the 
Military Police School Commandant requires that each new course of 
instruction have a complete job and task analysis performed which will 
provide the basis for the Commandant's training strategy. This analysis 
must contain as a minimum: 
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1. A list of the critical tasks by skill level and duty position. 
2. The conditions, standards and key elements (if available) for each task. 
3. The recommended location (unit or institutional) where each task will 
be taught. 
Since TRADOC believed that a need existed for the development of a 
counterterrorism training program on a near-term basis, a modified ISD 
process was required. The modification was based on the extensive time 
required to fully implement Phases I, II and III of the ISD process. 
TRADOC gave approval to modify the process in the spring of 1979 and 
development work officially began. A Management Plan with milestones 
was developed initially. This plan identified the first major activity as the 
development of a list of the instructional tasks. Subject matter experts at 
the Military Police School as well as other Federal and civilian institutions 
having counterterrorism expertise were consulted for input and guidance. 
The task list was validated by a jury of experts from various resources and 
the critical tasks for training were selected (See Table 1). From the critical 
tasks, job performance measures were constructed and validated. During 
the analysis phase an evaluation of existing courses within the federal 
government and civilian community was conducted to insure that a need 
for this course existed that was not fulfilled by another course; and second-
ly, to see what already available course material could be used to 
teach/identify tasks should this course be required. The next step involved 
grouping the tasks into clusters and where appropriate, identification of 
the instructional setting. Approval for all material compiled to date would 
complete Phase I of the ISD process and Phase II (design proposals) could 
then be developed. Approval of the task list was accomplished in May 
1979 and design work began. 
In Phase II the objectives were developed, testing methodology was 
selected, target population was described, and sequence and course struc-
ture was proposed. The target population for the course included all 
installation commanders and their staffs with an operational and planning 
role in countering terrorism. The grade structure includes majors through 
colonels or civilian equivalents. The course is primarily for members of the 
Emergency Operations Center and Crisis Management Teams as op-
posed to Hostage Negotiators of the Army's Special Reaction Teams. A 
number of specialized courses had been identified during Phase I which 
provide quality instruction for these functional areas; conversely, there 
were no courses that dealt with the command issues involved in threat 
analysis, prevention, and crisis management of terrorist activity. 
The staff of the M.P. School's Directorate of Training Development 
were responsible for the development of a model for counterterrorism 
planning, training and evaluation that was to become the basis for 
sequencing and course structure (See Figure 1). Testing in the course 
became a key issue. What is the most appropriate testing vehicle to insure 
that senior officers are capable of performing satisfactorily the job per-
formance measures? The final decision regarding student evaluation pro-
vided for the use of practical exercises in conjunction with each major 
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Table 1 
Selected Tasks For 
Counterterrorism Course 
1. 191-4102 Disseminate Intelligence Information 
2. 191-4107 Use Agencies for Info/Intell Gathering 
3. 191-4111 Enforce and Comply with Legal Restrictions on 
Information Gathering — OCONUS (Continental 
United States) 
4. 191-4201 Evaluate Threat Analysis Capability 
5. 191-4204 Describe the Transnational Threat 
6. 191-4301 Evaluate Physical Security Measures in Light of 
Potential Terrorist Threat 
7. 191-4302 Designate the Duties/Responsibilities of the Physical 
Security Officer 
8. 191-4303 Determine the Legal Basis of Access to a Military 
Installation 
9. 191-4401 Identify Personnel Protective Measures 
10. 191-4403 Evaluate Measures for the Protection of VIP's 
11. 191-4405 Determine Legal Basis of Military Protection of 
Potential Targets 
12. 191-4501 Use OPSEC (Operational Security) 
13. 191-4601 Determine Legal Sufficiency of a Crisis Management 
Plan 
14. 191-4603 Determine Legal Basis for Command Responsiveness to 
FBI/State Department 
15. 191-4604 Describe Negotiations Policy/Techniques 
16. 191-4605 Evaluate Current Local Authority and Jurisdiction 
Status 
17. 191-4701 Evaluate Crisis Management Capability 
18. 191-4702 Designate Responsibilities for Counterterrorism 
Planning/Action 
19. 191-4703 Evaluate Installation Counterterrorism Training 
Programs 
20. 191-4706 Coordinate Counterterrorism Planning with Local Law 
Agencies, FBI, State Department and Host Nation 
Officials as Appropriate 
21. 191-4707 Supervise Actions of the Crisis Management Team 
22. 191-4709 Plan for Contingencies 
23. 191-4801 Determine When to Activate the Crisis Management 
Team 
24. 191-4803 Implement Use of Force 
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block of instruction and a final simulation that would evaluate the 
student's capability to perform as a member of an installation crisis 
management team. Course flow and practical exercises, as currently 
taught, vary little from the original design. 
Phase III involves identification of specific learning events and 
activities. By utilizing the counterterrorism planning and training model 
with primary focus on the target population, students are placed in a role-
playing situation as a member of a mythical military installation. Since the 
projected target population would come from worldwide military installa-
tions, with varied jurisdictional problems, it was imperative that the 
instruction have a central theme. This mechanism and the utilization of a 
mythical installation provided standarization of instruction. To enhance 
role-playing, a scale model of this installation was developed and named 
"Fort Otan." Fort Otan has all the facilities associated with a military 
installation and the students are seated around it as members of the 
installation staff. Because effective utilization of such an instructional 
technique requires maximum "staff (student) interaction, the student 
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population was set at a minimum of twenty, optimum size of twenty-five, 
and maximum of thirty. Students are divided into three staffs: red, blue 
and green. Each staff is commanded by one of the three senior officers in 
the class (usually a Colonel). This strategy has proven to be an excellent 
methodology to accomplish the desired results and has been a highly 
successful teaching strategy. 
Other activities accomplished in Phase III included development of 
instructional management plans, review of existing materials appropriate 
to the course, development of instructional outlines and media, validation 
of instruction and development of a detailed Program of Instruction. The 
Program of Instruction must be approved by TRADOC and represents 
formal authorization to initiate the course. 
The first three phases of the developmental process are formally 
directed by the Directorate of Training Development. Although inter-
action is maintained among developmental components, formal responsi-
bility for course development shifts to the Directorate of Training and 
Doctrine when Phases IV and V of the ISD process are initiated. This shift 
represents a change in primary responsibility from the training developer 
to the instructional department. The major tasks the instructional depart-
ment must manage include lesson plan development, instructor and media 
selection, practical exercise development, classroom selection and 
enhancement, and refinement and validation of the instruction on a 
representative target population. The target date for the first "local" iter-
ation was set and a sample of students was selected. This first validation 
was extremely useful and from it the course flow and instruction were 
modified. The course was first taught to an actual audience in June of 
1980. Although there have been numerous changes since then, all have 
been relatively minor in nature. 
Current Course Implementation 
Figure 2 provides information regarding the currently adopted U.S. 
Army Military Police School's counterterrorism course. Instruction is 
provided in the seven categories identified earlier in the model. Although 
the course could be expanded to a longer format, the availability of the 
target population is limited. Senior military officials would be unable to 
attend an extended version of the course and the subsequent effectiveness 
of the course would diminish through representation by surrogates. 
The simulation exercise provides an opportunity for school officials to 
determine the extent and effectiveness of staff coordination, the appropri-
ateness and legality of decision-making, and the ability of commanders to 
maintain control during crisis management. Although the precise alter-
natives and decisions evaluated are not discussed in this article due to mili-
tary classification requirements, a more general understanding of the 
utility of simulation gaming has been provided by Stephen Sloan.16 
Discussion 
Although the model discussed above does not resolve many of the 
difficulties inherent in any attempt to develop appropriate enforcement 
Figure 2 
COUNTERTERRORISM COURSE FLOW 
Intro 
and 
Admin 
Intro 
to 
Terrorism 
Intro 
to Fort 
Otan 
Sources of 
Information 
Current Terrorist 
Threat 
Day One 
Day Two Authority Legal 
and Aspects 
Jurisdiction 
Day Three Operations 
Security 
(OPSEC) 
Day Four Crisis 
Manage-
ment 
Day Five Guest 
Speakers 
Personal 
Security 
(PERSEC) 
Hostage 
Negotia-
tions for 
Supervisors 
Critique 
Graduation 
Installation Practical 
Vulnerability Exercise 
Determination 
System 
Physical 
Security 
Seminar 
(Phys Secty) 
Special 
Reaction Team 
Training and 
Tactics 
OPSEC, PERSEC 
Physical 
Security 
PE 
Command 
Post Exercise 
techniques in a democratic society, it does provide a medium for develop-
ing a greater understanding of the complexity of this issue. Although this 
course is limited to an examination of terrorist activity which may occur 
on a military installation, one of the course's most important contributions 
is that it reinforces that basic limitation: installation commanders face 
significant restrictions on the utilization of military personnel to assist 
civilian law enforcement activities or on the collection of information 
about U.S. citizens. In the absence of a substantial Army interest in, for 
example, the major problem of protecting off-post military equipment, 
such utilization of military personnel or collection of intelligence would 
represent a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code 1385). In 
the absence of sufficient "Army interest," off-post acquisition of informa-
tion or use of military personnel must be based solely on presidential 
directives under civil disturbance guidelines (Army Regulation 380-13, 
paragraph 7) or it represents a violation of Posse Comitatus. 
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Secondly, the development of such a course requires instructors and 
students (in this case, high-ranking military officials) to engage in 
continuous dialogue regarding the impact of various decision-making 
alternatives. Although the utilization of simulation exercises fails to estab-
lish fully the severe consequences of faulty crisis management, it does pro-
vide an opportunity to examine the abilities of military staff personnel to 
arrive at decisions that reflect a rational attempt to address both the politi-
cal and humanitarian consequences of their actions. 
The difficulties inherent in the selection and adoption of acceptable re-
sponse strategies are formidable tasks facing western democratic societies. 
Most of these attempts will develop in a dialectical process where modifi-
cation in existing policies is the result of conflict in the political arena. 
Efforts are ongoing in several theoretical areas regarding the identification 
of acceptable tactics of liberal nations to the threat of terrorism. 
Bassiouni's attempts to identify the proper role of the media in their cover-
age of terrorist activity represents one such attempt. Although the military 
in most western nations may play an important role in responding to 
terrorism, little has been written which identifies the specific activities of 
military agencies with regard to contemporary efforts at preventing and 
responding to terrorism. Since the limits of military involvement in 
activities of domestic concern will ultimately be set by a variety of factors, 
only one of which is public opinion, it is vitally important that the public, 
and academicians in particular, be made aware of military activities which 
may have a profound effect upon public policy. Although most military 
activities are not restricted from the public formally, considerable military 
involvement traditionally had been cloaked in bureaucratic secrecy, 
perhaps due to adverse reviews from longstanding academicians critical of 
western foreign policy. By identifying contemporary military activities 
concerned with the terrorist phenomemon, dialogue may develop between 
various military components and the academic community which will lead 
to the development of standards of military conduct acceptable in western 
industrialized societies. 
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